Page 280:

1^st paragraph: "and full control over shipping"

1.    PRO, CAB99/17, minutes of British and American staff meetings, 11, 13-14 January, COS minutes, 12 January 1942; Farrell, The Basis and Making of British Grand Strategy, ch. 5.

2^nd paragraph: "‘to the personalities behind them’"

2.    PRO, CAB65/29, War Cabinet minutes, Confidential Annex, 17 January 1942; CAB99/17, Report on Arcadia Conference, 20 January 1942; BL, Cunningham Papers, 52561, Pound to Cunningham, 28 January 1942; Farrell, The Basis and Making of British Grand Strategy, ch. 5.

Page 281:

1^st paragraph: "only the Americans could help"

3.    PRO, CAB99/17, minutes of meeting between Churchill, COS, and R.G. Casey, 2 January 1942; Horner, 147.

2^nd paragraph: "and thus lose the naval base"

4.    PRO, FO371/31825, Churchill to Curtin, 13 January 1942.

Page 282:

1^st paragraph: "‘but decision where to employ rests with you’"

5.    PT, vol. 1, COS to Wavell, 8 January 1942.

1^st paragraph: "approach to the defence of Singapore over two decades!"

6.    PT, vol. 1, Wavell to COS, 12, 15 January, Churchill to Wavell, 15 January 1942.

Page 283:

1^st paragraph: "without undoing the offensive in North Africa"

7.    PT, vol. 5, Auchinleck to Brooke, 7 January, Churchill to Auchinleck, 11 January 1942; vol. 4, COS to MEDC, Cunningham to Admiralty, 10 January 1942; vol. 6, JSM to COS, 13 January 1942; Kimball, Churchill to Roosevelt, C-153, 7 January 1942; PRO, CAB79/17, COS minutes, 10 January 1942; CAB79/56, COS minutes, Confidential Annex, 9 January 1942.

2^nd paragraph: "before the end of that month"

8.    PT, vol. 1, Wavell to COS and Auchinleck, 12, 16 January, Auchinleck to Wavell and Brooke, 15, 16 January 1942.

2^nd paragraph: "and thus British grand strategy"

9.    PT, vol. 5, Auchinleck to Brooke, 1, 8 January, Auchinleck to Churchill, 12, 13, 23 January, Churchill to Auchinleck, 11, 13 January 1942; LHCMA, Brooke Papers, 3A/V, Brooke diary, 9 January 1942.

3^rd paragraph: "until the Mediterranean situation was stable"

10.    PT, vol. 1, Wavell to COS, 11, 21, 22 January, Churchill to Wavell, 15 January, Admiralty to Naval Establishments, 20 January 1942; ADM199/1472B, Layton Report; W.S. Churchill, The Second World War: The Hinge of Fate, Boston, 1951, 42. The First Sea Lord privately lashed out in response to criticism over the destruction of Force Z: "I do not know why both the House and the Public seem to think that the sinking of an important ship is a crime, whilst nobody takes any notice of the loss of 30 or 40 bombers in one night due to inaccurate met reports, or to the many failures of the Army": BL, Cunningham Papers, 52561, Pound to Cunningham, 28 January 1942.

Page 284:

1^st paragraph: "Singapore was no such position."

11.    Many of Churchill’s telegrams and minutes are reproduced in his war memoirs. His own explanation is in The Hinge of Fate, 43-44.The emphasis is his. The best discussion of this issue is Callahan, "Churchill and Singapore," in Farrell and Hunter, Sixty Years On.

Indented quote: "prevent crossing Johore Straits ..."

12.    PT, vol. 1, Wavell to Churchill, 16 January 1942; Churchill, The Hinge of Fate, 43.

Page 285:

3^rd indented quote: "that could possibly be exposed"

13.    Churchill, The Hinge of Fate, 43-45; Callahan, "Churchill and Singapore," in Farrell and Hunter, Sixty Years On, 165-67. Churchill’s emphasis.

Page 286:

1^st paragraph: "This was the first time London gave any such order."

14.    Brooke claimed Churchill was specifically told no preparations were made for tactical defence of the island against attack from the north, and ordered an inquiry: PRO, CAB79/17, COS minutes, 19 January 1942. The general explanations offered by the COS the year before do not support that claim, nor is there any record of that inquiry. CAB65/29, War Cabinet minutes, Confidential Annex, 19 January 1942; PT, vol. 1, COS to Wavell, 20 January 1942; Churchill, The Hinge of Fate, 45-47. The COS made ten detailed and thinly veiled tactical "suggestions." These actually emanated from Simson, who was prompted by Duff Cooper to suggest what needed to be done; Cooper passed them to Churchill, who now sent them back. See below, chapter 14 and Epilogue.

2^nd paragraph: "and to what purpose?"

15.    PT, vol. 1, GOC Burma to Wavell, 18-21 January, Wavell to Churchill, 19-21 January, Wavell to COS, 20, 21 January, Pownall to Churchill, 20 January, COS to Wavell, 19 January 1942; PRO, CAB106/38, Wavell Despatch; Churchill, The Hinge of Fate, 46-49.

Page 287:

1^st paragraph: "as the man on the spot"

16.    PRO, CAB69/4, DC(O) minutes, 21 January 1942; CAB79/56, COS minutes, Confidential Annex, 21 January 1942; CAB80/33, COS(42)37, 20 January 1942; CAB80/61, Churchill to Ismay, 21 January 1942; CCA, A.V. Alexander Papers, 5/7/8, Alexander to Pound, 21 January 1942; Churchill, The Hinge of Fate, 49-50.

2^nd paragraph: "These were preparations for defeat, not relief"

17.    PT, vol. 1, Admiralty to Rear Admiral Malaya, 15, 21 January, COS to Percival, 21 January 1942. Spooner was responsible for the naval base and light forces assigned to it. By a cruel irony, his previous appointment was to command the Repulse.

2^nd paragraph: "There is no doubt what a purely military decision should have been."

18.    Churchill, The Hinge of Fate, 52; Willmott, 320.

Page 288:

1^st paragraph: "an effect ‘terrible to imagine’"

19.    PT, vol. 1, COS to C-in-C India, 22 January, Churchill to Wavell, 23 January 1942; Churchill, The Hinge of Fate, 52.

2^nd paragraph: "Then came the news about setbacks in Johore."

20.    AWM, 73/2, excerpts of telegrams to and from Bowden, 9-26 January 1942; Horner, 147-54; Menzies, 52; Wigmore, 288-89.

Page 289:

1^st paragraph: "the British must fight it out in Singapore

21.    AWM, 73/2, excerpts of telegrams to and from Bowden, 19, 23, 26 January 1942; Horner, 150-53; Wigmore, 288-89; Warren, 180-81.

2^nd paragraph: "make a decision the British government dare not"

22.    PRO, CAB65/25, War Cabinet minutes, 22, 26 January, 2 February 1942; CAB65/29, Confidential Annex, 26 January 1942. Fortunately for the British the Americans agreed they should continue to "coordinate" Dominion "political" views for the war against Japan, especially the ABDA theatre, and Dominion officers would only be invited to brief the CCS as and when relevant: Kimball, Roosevelt to Churchill, FDR-78, 30 January 1942. The solution was to establish parallel Pacific War Councils, which publicly appeared to be councils of war but in fact were a sop to the smaller allies. This was politically dangerous, as one minister noted: "Australia is the most dangerous obstacle in the path of this government"; CCA, A.V. Alexander Papers, Alexander to ?, 26 January 1942. Churchill, The Hinge of Fate, 50-52; Callahan, "Churchill and Singapore," in Farrell and Hunter, Sixty Years On, 167; Callahan, The Worst Disaster, 259-60.

Page 290:

1^st paragraph: "‘strategic analysis versus politics and emotion’"

23.    Horner, 147-54.

2^nd paragraph: "fight on for Singapore"

24.    PRO, CAB65/25, War Cabinet minutes, 22 January 1942; CAB79/56, COS minutes, Confidential Annex, 31 January 1942; PT, vol. 5, Auchinleck to Churchill, 24, 26-30 January, Churchill to Auchinleck, 24, 25, 28 January 1942; LHCMA, Brooke Papers, 3A/V, Brooke diary, 30 January 1942; Churchill, The Hinge of Fate, ch. 4; Farrell, The Basis and Making of British Grand Strategy, 260-62. See CCA, Hankey Papers, for an example of the views of a strong critic of Churchill’s war direction.

Indented quote: "to resist Japanese advance"

25.    PT, vol. 1, Wavell to COS, 26, 29 January, Wavell to Churchill, 26 January, JSM to Admiralty, 27 January, Hutton to Wavell, 31 January 1942; vol. 6, COS to JSM, 28 January 1942; PRO, CAB106/38, Wavell Despatch.

Page 291: