Page 383:

2^nd paragraph: "‘it created a strange impression’"

1.    JM, Number 54, Malaya Operations Record; Frei, 145; Warren, 271.

Page 384:

1^st paragraph: "to bolster the defence of Burma"

2.    The British assumed the Australians would fall in line again and were upset when they did not. The change was abrupt. As soon as he heard about Percival’s surrender Lt.-Gen. John Laverack, GOC I Australian Corps, advised his government not to deploy the corps in the Dutch islands: PRO, CAB79/18 and 79/56, COS minutes, 20-23 February 1942, CAB88/1, CCS minutes, 17 February 1942; CAB106/153, Wavell to Brooke, 17 February, and Appendix B, precis of telegrams relating to employment of I Australian Corps, 31 January-20 February 1942.

Page 385:

1^st paragraph: "to intimidate them into accepting Japanese imperium"

3.    JM, Number 54, Malaya Operations Record; Frei, ch. 10.

1^st paragraph: "while they decided what to do with them"

4.    JM, Number 54, Malaya Operations Record; SCSC, Outline of the Malayan Campaign; Frei, ch. 10; Lee Kuan Yew, The Singapore Story: Memoirs of Lee Kuan Yew, Singapore, 1998, 55; Murfett et al, Between Two Oceans, 259-60; Warren, 272.

2^nd paragraph: "Sugita supposedly admitted to a Japanese reporter"

5.    Frei, 147-55; Murfett et al, Between Two Oceans, 249-51; Warren, 278-79; Few prominent Chinese individuals on the Japanese target list were caught. Lim Bo Seng and Tan Kah Kee escaped overseas, but Lim was captured while organizing resistance groups in Perak in 1944 and tortured to death in prison. PRO, WO172/180, Faber Fire Command War Diary, February 1942, records one incident when bodies of murdered Chinese civilians were recovered by British and Indian troops at Blakang Mati. The large Oral History collection in the Singapore National Archives contains information about all aspects of the sook ching and occupation years.

Page 386:

1^st paragraph: "status as helots for the new Sparta and followed orders"

6.    Fuijiwara, 192-93; Frei, ch. 10; Murfett et al, Between Two Oceans, ch. 9; Dower, 285, 290. One Japanese officer cited by Frei corroborated one argument made by Ward in The Killer They Called a God, Singapore, 1992: the staff officer who pressed the massacre most insistently was Tsuji.

Page 388:

2^nd paragraph: "direct ABDA Command through its death throes"

7.    PRO, CAB106/163, Wavell to Brooke, 17 February 1942; CAB106/38, Wavell despatch; Farrell, The Basis and Making of British Grand Strategy, ch. 12.

Page 389:

1^st paragraph: "‘Save England’s Asian Colonies’"

8.    Farrell, The Basis and Making of British Grand Strategy, chs. 13-14.

Page 390:

1^st paragraph: "playing into the hands of Congress"

9.    Warren, 274-78; Warren, "The Indian Army and the Fall of Singapore," in Farrell and Hunter, Sixty Years On. Mackenzie, 403-04; D. James, Rise and Fall of the Japanese Empire, 425.

Page 391:

1^st paragraph: "did not catch this change in mood"

10.    Lee Kip Lee, Amber Sands: A Boyhood Memoir, Singapore, 1995, 120; Murfett et al, Between Two Oceans, ch. 9; Kratoska, Malaya and Singapore during the Japanese Occupation.

1^st paragraph: "and the British presence there"

11.    Murfett et al, Between Two Oceans, ch. 11; A. Lau, The Malayan Union Controversy 1942-1948, Oxford, 1992.

Page 392:

1^st paragraph: "when they decided to leave too early"

12.    Lee Kuan Yew, 45; Murfett et al, Between Two Oceans, ch. 11.

Page 395:

1^st paragraph: "more willing to pay the price than the Allies"

13.    SCSC, Outline of the Malayan Campaign; JM, Number 54, Malaya Operations Record; JM, Number 55, Southwest Area Air Operations Record; Shores et al, 384.

2^nd paragraph: "what were surely picked Japanese troops"

14.    PT, vol. 1, Wavell to WO, 15 February 1942; PRO, CAB69/4, DO(42)17, 16 February 1942.

Page 396:

1^st indented quote: "hardness and fighting spirit"

15.    PRO, CAB79/18, COS minutes, 18, 20 February 1942; CAB65/25, War Cabinet minutes, 16, 25 February 1942; CAB69/4, DC(O) minutes, 16 February, 2 March 1942; CAB88/1, CCS minutes, 17, 23 February, 3 March 1942; CAB106/163, Wavell to Brooke, 17 February 1942; LHCMA, Brooke Papers, 3A/V, diary entry 11 February 1942 and notes for that month; Pownall Papers, diary entries, 15, 19 February 1942; Kimball, Churchill-Roosevelt Correspondence, vol. 1, FDR #106, 18 February, C #37, 5 March 1942.

2^nd indented quote: "in case of attack"

16.    PRO, WO106/5158, CO to Governors [ten different colonies], 3 June 1942; Dower, 84.

Page 397:

1^st indented quote: "And it did ...."

17.    PRO, CAB106/58, 11^th Indian Division history, ch. XXV; LHCMA, Pownall Papers, diary entry, 25 February 1942.

2^nd paragraph: "had it been better led"

18.    AWM, 54/553/5/16, Bennett report; PRO,WO208/1529, April 1942 comments; Callahan, "Churchill and Singapore," in Farrell and Hunter, Sixty Years On.

Page 398:

1^st paragraph: "‘their beastly general’"

19.    PRO, WO208/1529, April 1942 reports; WO106/2250A, Layton to Pound, 28 March 1942, Stewart comments enclosed, and Stewart memo, 12 July 1942; CAB106/91, Stewart to Maj.-Gen. G. Thorpe, 14 March 1942; AWM, 54/553/3/2, NCF Training Notes No. 6, 6 April 1942; PREM3/168/3, has the report as endorsed by Wavell but only circulated to the War Cabinet more than three months after being submitted: WP(42)314, 8 September 1942, and related correspondence between Churchill, Attlee and the Secretariat, July-September 1942; IWM, Percival Papers, File 43, Brooke-Popham to Percival, 28 July 1946;Callahan, "Churchill and Singapore," in Farrell and Hunter, Sixty Years On.

2^nd paragraph: "starting with the official histories"

20.    Important examples are PRO, CAB106/58, 11^th Indian Division history, ch. XXV; CAB106/70, 18^th Division history; CAB106/117, 44^th Brigade narrative; CAB106/162, Thyer report; Heath’s postmortems are in CAB106/80, notes on 11^th Indian Division history, and IWM, Heath Papers, LMH4, LMH7; the discussions with Percival are in Percival Papers, P.21, F.26. Peter Stanley, "The men who did the fighting are now all busy writing" in Farrell and Hunter, Sixty Years On, is an important analysis of postmortems in general and the Thyer-Kappe report in particular.

3^rd paragraph: "to write his report, without any real assistance"

21.    The WO stalled Percival, telling him in October 1945 the COS did not want him to hold a press conference because "the press takes things out of context," and Attlee did not want to provoke any pressure for an enquiry but rather push the matter off onto the despatches: IWM, Percival Papers, File 43, WO to Percival, 31 October 1945.

Page 399:

1^st paragraph: "Never was support less deserved."

22.    Bennett argued he escaped to bring home priceless information about how to fight the Japanese. In fact the Australian Army paid more attention to reports by Stewart and the American military observer in Malaya and Burma, Col. Francis G. Brink, than to Bennett’s advice: AWM, 54/553/3/2, NCF Training Notes No. 6, 6 April 1942; 73/65, Japanese Tactical Methods, February 1942. Bennett’s deepest motive appeared to be to prevent regular force generals from leading the Army to victory while he sat out the rest of the war in captivity. Lodge, 214-16. Murdoch’s article "New Light on the Last Days of Singapore"appeared in The Advertiser, an Adelaide newspaper, on 17 August 1942.

Page 400:

1^st paragraph: "‘stimulate public demand for a wider investigation’"

23.    PRO, CAB119/208, Chiffley to Attlee, 28 January, 8 February, extracts from COS minutes, 29, 31 January, 4 February, 8 March, Attlee to Chiffley, 31 January, 15 February, JP(46)29(S)(TofR), 4 February, JP(46)29(Final) 5 March, JP(46)56(S)(TofR), 8 March, JP(46)56(Final), 6 May 1946; CAB121/765, Hollis to Ismay, 31 January 1946.

Indented quote: "which met their comments ...."

24.    PRO, WO32/15539, Papers relating to preparation of Percival’s Despatch, April 1947-June 1949; Percival’s ludicrous claim about Japanese numbers is in a letter he wrote to the WO on 3 May 1948. CAB119/208, Attlee’s telegrams to Chiffley, plus extract from COS minutes, 15 May, and Hollis to Ismay, 23 July 1946; CAB121/765, Stapleton to Attlee, 12 August, Attlee to Ismay, 16 August, extract from COS minutes, 22 November 1946, CO to Attlee, 27 October 1947; IWM, File 43, Percival Papers, Maltby to Percival, 16 January, Percival-WO correspondence, April-August, Percival-Thomas correspondence August 1947, Percival-WO correspondence May 1948, Percival-MacArthur correspondence, July-October 1948; Percival, Despatch.

Page 401:

1^st paragraph: "and onto the men on the spot"

25.    PRO, CAB106/45, Tan Kah Kee to Secretary of State for War, 3 March, Percival to A.L. Birt, 21 April 1948; WO32/15539, CO to WO 13 April and WO reply, n/d, 1948; Percival, The War in Malaya, 298-99, 304-06.

2^nd paragraph: "by the men on the spot"

26.    PRO, CAB121/765, BDCSEA to DC, 23 June, 2 July, COS to SEALF, 27 June, 3 September, COS(47)100, 23 August 1947; Callahan, "Churchill and Singapore,"in Farrell and Hunter, Sixty Years On.

Indented quote: "and delicate political issues"

27.    PRO, CAB119/208, JP(46)29(Final), 5 March, JP(46)56(S)(TofR), 8 March, JP(46)56(Final), 6 May 1946.

Page 403:

1^st paragraph: "‘in other parts of the Colonial Empire’"

28.    PRO, CAB119/208, JP(46)29(Final) 5 March, JP(46)56(S)(TofR), 8 March, JP(46)56(Final), 6 May 1946.

Page 404:

1^st paragraph: "blamed solely on men on the spot"

29.    PRO, WO32/16167, Briefing Notes on Far East for Lord Privy Seal, 7 January 1942; The general editor of the Grand Strategy series in the British official history, J.R.M. Butler, wrote Percival in 1962 "Any student of the Malayan campaign must sympathize deeply with you in the desperate position in which you were placed by the prewar policy of governments": IWM, File 43, Percival Papers, Butler to Percival, 11 January 1962.

Page 405:

2^nd paragraph: "forced the army to reconsider its way of war"

30.    Stewart responded to publication of the despatches by revisiting his own appraisal of the campaign. He argued "What was possible was the Battle School standard of 1943 onwards. What was done was the Army standard of 1939/40": PRO, CAB106/91, The Loss of Singapore: A Criticism, n/d [1948]. Strong studies of subsequent changes in the British Army’s approach to war are French, Raising Churchill’s Army, and Place, Military Training in the British Army.

Page 406: